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The basic proposition advanced in this article is that if both the
United States and Taiwan were to follow a rational system of actions
based upon adherence to international law concepts, Taiwan can still be
regarded as a sovereign state under international law. Domestic legislative
remedies in both countries to define their new relationship in the after-
math of derecognition can assure a healthy economic relation without
outside interference.
Being guided in part by a spirit of synthesis and summary, analyzing
this proposition involves a higher level of abstraction and inference than
one would normally expect in a position paper of this sort. The focus is
narrowed essentially by a strict international law perspective initially,
and by an international economic perspective in the second part of the
article. Although the future cultural, educational and military-security re-
lated ties between the United States and Taiwan are outside the scope of
this article, their importance should not be ignored.
New legislation must be enacted, particularly in the United States, in
order to eliminate the confusion that still abounds in the minds of Ameri-
can businessmen doing business in Taiwan. Although the topic of United
States-Taiwan relationships mandates a prescriptive approach, empirical
concerns about the realities of recent world politics and the uncertain fu-
ture that Taiwan faces today as a result of the American termination of
the mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China1 necessarily im-
pinge on the analysis. -
* Professor of Political Science and International Law, Western Illinois University;
B.A. (1962), M.A. (1963) California State University, Sacramento; M.A. (1966), Ph.D. (1967)
University of Oregon; Former Diplomat, Pakistan Foreign Service.
I Mutual Defense Treaty, December 12, 1954, United States - Republic of China, [1955]
6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178 [hereinafter cited as Mutual Defense Treaty]. The United
States delivered a notice of termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty to the Taiwan gov-
ernment on December 23, 1978, which became effective on January 1, 1979. Pursuant to the
terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the notification terminated the Treaty on January 1,
1980. Mutual Defense Treaty, supra at art. X.
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Specifically, two propositions seem to have the greatest significance
for the American business community today, and each can be discussed
and supported in the realm of international law. The first addresses the
current status of the government and people of Taiwan under general in-
ternational law. As far as international law and its current practices are
concerned, America's derecognition of Taiwan's government does not
spell the end of the world for Taiwan. Indeed, it can be shown that under
international law Taiwan still has a legal personality, enjoys certain very
important protections, and retains significant responsibilities. In this con-
text even the position of the United States is not entirely without certain
favorable legal consequences for Taiwan. For instance, the United States
still recognizes Taiwan as a separate political entity for domestic consid-
eration purposes. Therefore, it may statutorily confer on Taiwan any ben-
efits without regard to its recognition of the People's Republic of China
as the sole legal government of China.2 The United States simply takes
no position on the status of Taiwan under international law.
The second significant proposition for American businessmen is that
the United States has attempted to alleviate any serious implications and
negative consequences inhibiting continued economic cooperation be-
tween the United States and Taiwan as a result of derecognition. With
additional Taiwanese legislation and reasonable construction of the laws
of both countries, Taiwan can be treated fairly and equitably as a unique
case under American law. What follows in this paper is a detailed discus-
sion of the above two propositions and their legal implications.
TAIWAN'S CURRENT STATUS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Very simply put, the existence of a state or government under interna-
tional law is generally a question independent of its recognition by one or
more other countries.3 Under current legal practices and international
2 See Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (codified as 22
U.S.C.A. §§ 3301-16 (West Supp. 1979)) [hereinafter cited as Taiwan Relations Act]; text
accommpanying notes 3-13 infra.
2 Under the so-called constitutive theory of recognition, "the international personality
of a state or the ability to represent it as a government depends on recognition by the state
community." B. BoT, NoN-RECOGNrrlON AND TREATY RELATIONS 146 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as BOT]. The validity of the constitutive theory is questionable in light of present
principles and practices of international law. Since recognition is extended at different times
by different countries, applying the constitutive theory would mean that a state would have
an international personality for some of its neighbors but not for others. Also, if an unrecog-
nized state did not exist legally, there would be no valid reason to require that entity to
adhere to any principles or duties of international law. Finally, recognition generally is given
retroactive effect but under the constitutive theory there is no basis on which to validate the
acts of a previously unrecognized regime which did not exist at the time it acted. Id.
The constitutive theory has been the subject of severe criticism. See, e.g., L. JAFFE,
JUDIcIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 19 (1933) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE]. In general, a
nation's existence should be determined without reference to whether or not other states
have officially recognized it. See BOT, supra at 60; T. CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
RECOGNITION 13 (1951) [hereinafter cited as CHEN]. Critics of the constitutive theory differ,
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conduct, diplomatic recognition of a country by other members of the in-
ternational community frequently hinges on the pursuit for mutual bene-
fits or the existence of common interests. Moreover, recognition may be
withdrawn, or transferred to another country which may lay claims on the
disputed territory, when an antagonistic relationship develops between
two countries, often due only to new perceptions of national interests. In
the case of the United States' transfer of recognition from Taiwan to the
People's Republic of China, a major shift in the American interests
abroad had taken place. The United States, being a sovereign state, has
the right under international law to respond to such a shift, notwith-
standing questions of morality or sentimentality.
On the other hand, most legal scholars agree that the existence of a
state or government, even in a disputed territory or under political lead-
ership that is being challenged by another faction in that country, de-
pends on more objective, technical factors.4 A country "exists" in interna-
tional law when 1) its leadership is in effective control of the state's
defined territory; 2) the bulk of its inhabitants possess sufficient political
stability and provide allegiance to whatever national symbols there might
be; 3) the leadership possesses sufficient administrative capability to
carry out certain well recognized internal government functions and its
international obligations under international law and the United Nations
Charter; and 4) there is no massive and systematic interference in its do-
mestic affairs by a foreign power.5 While a state that meets these require-
ments may "exist" in the world community, other states generally will
extend recognition only if there are no overriding political considerations
dictating a contrary policy. Recognition does not necessarily connote ap-
proval of the method by which the leadership came to power, or of the
philosophy, political institutions and programs of the new regime. In
most instances it simply reflects a legal and political reality. Withholding,
however, as to the effect recognition does have. Compare JAFFE, supra note 111 ("nonrecog-
nition should be considered not as a denial of international personality, but as a sanction, as
a mode of compelling an international personality to perform its duties") with CHEN, supra
at 135 and BoT, supra at 18 (recognition has wider scope than declaratory existence in that
the former opens diplomatic relations and "full membership in the family of nations.")
Thus, even though a nation's existence does not hinge on whether it is recognized, non-
recognition can, and in practice often does, affect the role an unrecognized entity plays in
the international community. See text accompanying note 6 infra.
4 Some scholars distinguish between recognition of states and of governments. See, e.g.,
BOT, supra note 3, at 22-23; H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 87
(1947). An example of the ramifications this distinction can have arose in the United Na-
tions debates concerning recognition and admission of Vietnam and Bengla Desh. In order
for a state to be recognized, there must exist a requisite level of political and economic
stability within a defined territory. Rather than stability, the level of control a regime can
assert over a population and territory is the threshold issue in determining whether or not a
government is effective enough to be recognized. See BoT, supra note 3, at 22-23. For pur-
poses of this article, no such distinction is made explicitly, but implicit in the discussion is
the thesis that Taiwan exists as a state and its government is in effective control.
1 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 4, 100,
101 (1965). See also JAFFE, supra note 3, at 21, 60; LAUTERPAcHT, supra note 3, at 26-30.
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withdrawing or transferring recognition thus becomes an act of foreign
policy, and perceptions of national self interests play a determining role.
American policy towards China graphically illustrates the dichotomy
between the questions of a state's existence and its recognition by other
countries. The decision to recognize the government of Taiwan as the sole
spokesman for all the Chinese people stemmed from severe conflicts of
interest, purpose, and national goals between the United States and the
People's Republic of China.1 This recognition policy simply ignored the
political and legal reality of the existence of People's Republic of China.
Once Taiwan was recognized as the government of China, it was only a
matter of time before United States provided it massive doses of eco-
nomic assistance and a military commitment to defend it against any
aggression.8
Now, of course, "the overriding political considerations" once again
are responsible for the shift in American foreign policy. Recognition has
been extended to the People's Republic. Taiwan is derecognized and the
Mutual Defense Treaty9 is terminated. 10 However, according to the
Carter administration, Taiwan remains a country of sorts for purposes of
6 Recognition policy may be determined by political considerations and may have far-
reaching political effects. A statement made by then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
-in connection with United States policy towards East Germany evidenced official cognizance
of the role political factors play in the initial decision of whether to extend recognition. He
rhetorically asked why. the United States and Great.Britain had not recognized East Ger-
many, and stated that it would be
politically disadvantageous and harmful to our interests to do it. So the guide in
these things isn't something doctrinaire, that you have to give recognition of a
diplomatic character to a regime which is hostile to you and where it involves
great disadvantages to do it .... But on the other hand we do not accept the
blind policy of pretending that it doesn't exist. It does exist. We know it exists.
39 DEP'T ST. BULL. 735 (1958). See also LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3, at 33-36; JAFFE, supra
note 3, at 112.
Recognition policy also has important political effects. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3,
at 36-37. Of course, the effects a policy of recognition or non-recognition likely will have
may be the political considerations that enter into the final decision. Primary among these
effects are the possible protests and other reactions of sister states and the possibility, where
a newly recognized state has revolted against or receded from another, of a declaration of
war against the recognizing state. Id. at 36 & n.5.
The frequency with which political factors are decisive in a decision of whether or not
to extend recognition is not easily quantified. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3, at 37. Never-
theless, since any recognition policy unquestionably has some political ramifications, they
will be considered in connection with the initial decision to withhold, extend, withdraw or
transfer recognition.
See generally Dean, United States Foreign Policy and Formosa, 33 FOREIGN AFF. 360
(1955).
' See, e.g., Agreement on the Furnishings of Certain Military Material to China for the
Defense of Taiwan, February 9, 1951, United States - Republic of China, [1952] 2 U.S.T.
1499, T.I.A.S. No. 2293; Agreement to Facilitate Construction of Defense Facilities, Nov-
ember 21, 1956, United States - Republic of China [1957] 7 U.S.T. 3411, T.I.A.S. No. 3713.




United States domestic laws.1 The Administration has stated that it rec-
ognizes the People's Republic as the sole legal government of China and
that Taiwan is a part of China. But the simple fact under international
law remains that the People's Republic existed as a state before American
recognition, and Taiwan exists now as a state, with all the privileges and
obligations under international law after American derecognition. The le-
gal concept of state responsibility is equally applicable to both Chinas
because they both meet the legal requirements of statehood under inter-
national law. 2 Clearly, any sovereign nation has the legal right to with-
draw or withhold diplomatic recognition of another state if its own na-
tional security requirements, economic welfare or broader national
interest so demand. Nevertheless, the strict and demonstrational require-
ments of political control and stability, administrative capability and in-
ternational accountability, the existence of a well-defined territory, and
the lack of massive intrusion from a foreign government determine
whether a state exists under international law. Under this standard, Tai-
wan exists as a state under international law, and the legal precepts that
will guide nations dealing with Taiwan, and the consequences of those
relationships, must be determined in light of that status.13
Beyond general international law concepts, past legal practices also
substantiate the thesis that even after derecognition the United States
and other nations are definitely under certain legal obligations to respect
Taiwan's rights, responsibilities and prerogatives in the international
arena. The Charter of the Organization of American States,1 4 (O.A.S.
Charter) adopted at Bogota in 1948, and largely written by the United
States,'3 reflects some of the deeply held beliefs in America on this point.
It provides the best guarantee to the people and government of Taiwan
that mutually beneficial bilateral relations will persist as long as Taiwan
is able to maintain its status as an existing sovereign state under the re-
11 Presidents' Message to Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation, 15 WEEKLY
CoMp. OF PRES. Doc. 165 (Jan. 26, 1979).
'2 See text accompanying note 5 supra. As early as 1955 authorities and commentators
characterized the Communist regime as the de facto government of Mainland China. See
Wright, The Chinese Recognition Problem, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 320, 321-23, 321 n.3 (1955). At
the same time, Chiang Kai-Shek's government was considered the de facto government of
Formosa and the Pescadores. Id. at 323. The factors of stability, control, and territory that
led to these characterizations parallel the requirements for a state's existence.
'3 See BoT, supra note 3, at 33-35; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FORmoN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNrrED STATES § 107, (Comment 1, Illustration 1) (1965); 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 604-06 (1963) [hereinafter cited as WHITEMAN]. For examples of in-
stances in which the United States has had relations with unrecognized states, largely for
political reasons, see JAFFE, supra note 3, at 112-16.
14 Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 2416,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361 [hereinafter cited as OAS Charter].
' For a general discussion of the evolution of the Organization of American States, see
J. DRIER, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE HEMISPERE CRISIS 1041 (1962);
INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
xv-xxxvi (1966).
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quirements of international law. Article 19 of the O.A.S. Charter reads:
The political existence of a state is independent of recognition
by other states. Even before being recognized, the state has the
right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its
preservation and prosperity and consequently to organize itself as
it sees fit, to legislate concerning its interests, to administer its
services and to determine jurisdiction and competence of its
courts. The exercise of these rights is limited only by the exercise
of the rights of other states in accordance with international
law.
16
This provision represents the United States' attitude and legal think-
ing on the rights of an unrecognized state, which suggest that a meaning-
ful and economically beneficial relationship can be maintained with the
government and people of Taiwan through the American Institute in Tai-
wan (Institute)17 and appropriate federal legislation. Surely the United
States could deny the Island government, within its own territory and
absent proper domestic laws, certain privileges. The denial may extend to
Taiwanese business corporations, individual citizens, or special groups
such as athletes.' 8 For instance, the United States could have denied
Taiwanese privileges by withdrawing immunity before its domestic
courts, something states generally consider very important to gaining the
recognition of other countries. Nevertheless, the point is that an unrecog-
nized or derecognized state simply cannot be ignored totally by the na-
tion that withdraws recognition, even if it so wishes. The extent of accom-
modation, informal contact, and transactions between the two countries
will depend upon the attitude of the two governments involved.' 9 Of
OAS Charter, supra note 14, art. 19; T.I.A.S. No. 2361.
17 Congress created the Institute in section 6 of the Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 2,
22 U.S.C.A. § 3305 (West Supp. 1979). The Institute is incorporated under the District of
Columbia Non-Profit Corporation Act. See D.C. CODE: § 29-1001 to 10991 (1973).
"' See JAFFE, supra note 3, at 121. The flexibility with which the United States can deal
with domestic privileges for Taiwan was evidenced by judicial refusal to allow Taiwanese
athletes to participate in the 1980 Winter Olympics in the United States under the flag and
name of "Republic of China." See Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Games,
Inc., 72 App. Div. 2d 439, 424 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1980).
's See generally WHITEMAN, supra note 13, at 604-05. Several States, which do not rec-
ognize the German Democratic Republic nevertheless maintain an attitude of mutual coop-
eration with the G.D.R. Consequently they adopt the position that the G.D.R. became a
party to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 by signing the copy provided to the Soviet
Union. They consider East Germany to have committed itself, as a soverign state, to abide
by the provisions of the treaty in accordance with principles of international law. There is
no question that a nation may engage in informal relations with an unrecognized State. See
text accompanying note 13 supra. Indeed, in the late 1950's, the United States acknowl-
edged this possibility with respect to its policies towards the Chinese communist regime
long before extending recognition was likely. British Television Interview With Secretary of
State Dulles (October 7, 1958), reprinted in 39 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 735 & n. 4 (1958); Address
by John Foster Dulles (June 28, 1957), reprinted in 37 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 91, 93 (1957). In his
address, Secretary Dilles made clear that the decision not to initiate informal trade or cul-
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course, the United States presently does not intend to ignore Taiwan, or
to cut off all forms of commercial, educational and cultural ties with it,
and a future administration in Washington that wishes to do so will find
it extremely difficult to accomplish such a goal. The intent of the legisla-
tion on the American side is to preserve existing commercial, cultural and
other unofficial relations by authorizing the continuation of existing con-
tracts, statutory programs and other relevant portions of federal law.20 In
this context, the purpose of the Institute will be to coordinate future rela-
tions between the two nations. The Institute, being a private corporation,
organized under the Non-Profit Corporation Act of the District of Colum-
bia,21 can handle almost any kind of transaction, or exchange of goods
and services, unofficially.2 2 Its activities can be controlled easily by means
of a contract between it and the Department of State.
The United States on many occasions in the past has conducted its
business overseas through non-government organizations. 23 Past delega-
tural relations with the unrecognized communists was based on perceived communist Chi-
nese animosity towards the United States and China's Asian neighbors. Id. at 93. Thus
where a nonrecognized state is hostile towards the country withholding recognition, permis-
sible unofficial contacts that may strengthen the unrecognized state will be avoided. JAFFE,
supra note 3, at 38. By logical extension, however, if the unrecognized state is not hostile,
unofficial relations will be undertaken to the extent they comport with the best interests of
the United States. In those situations, strengthening the unrecognized State not only may
be a harmless consequence, but it may further foreign policy objectives.
20 22 U.S.C.A. § 3301(a) (West Supp. 1979); see S. REP. No. 7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 7,
reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 650, 656, 668 [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT]. The stated statutory purposes underlying the Taiwan Relations Act are:
(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific;
and
(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the
continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of
the United States and the people of Taiwan.
22 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (West Supp. 1979).
21 22 U.S.C.A. § 3301(a)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1979). SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 25
[1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 674.
22 While the Institute was designed to serve as the principal vehicle through which un-
official relations with Taiwan would be maintained, the Senate Report makes clear that the
Act is sufficiently flexible to authorize the use of other unofficial channels toward the same
goal. SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 25 [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 674. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee felt that President Carter's initial proposal for the Tai-
wan Rblations Act did not afford the requisite level of flexibility. Compare President's Mes-
sage to Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 165,
166 (Jan. 26, 1979) with SENATE REPORT, supra note 20 at 25 [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws at 674.
23 SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 20 [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 669.
The Senate Report cites general examples of instances in which the United States has en-
deavored to pursue foreign policy objectives by contracting with non-governmental entities
for them to engage in specific activities. Foreign aid programs have been augmented by
American educational institutions agreeing to implement training programs, and private
businesses have helped institute economic development programs. Id. The primary differ-
ences between past arrangements and the Institute are that the Institute was created specif-
ically for a foreign policy purpose, and has been granted a substantially wider sphere of
activity.
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tions of these functions, however, have not been as extensive or diverse as
the Institute's powers will be. The establishment of such an Institute does
not make the United States the first country to have shifted diplomatic
recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China while seeking
to maintain commercial relations with Taiwan in one form or the other.
Other western industrial countries, including Japan, already have done
that successfully. In each case, Taiwan has adapted to the changes in a
flexible and imaginative manner with continued prosperity. Japan, for in-
stance, shifted recognition to the People's Republic of China in 1972, but
the Japanese worked out simple, and mutually advantageous ways to pre-
serve unofficial relations with Taiwan.24 Now the Japanese seem to be
competing aggressively for the consumer market in the People's Republic
also without giving up anything in Taiwan. On the other hand, the United
States, for the first time, has received strong assurances from the People's
Republic of China that it will not annex Taiwan by use of military force.
Consequently, the United States was able to withdraw its military com-
mitments to protect Taiwan" and concentrate its military resources in
the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean region in order to contain Soviet
military adventurism. Like Japan, the United States should be able to
pursue its immediate national interests while retaining important ties to
Taiwan notwithstanding its decision to derecognize the Island
government.
AFTER DERECOGNITION: TAIWAN'S FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
UNITED STATES
There are indeed some serious implications for both Taiwan and the
United States resulting from America's shift of recognition to the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. In the following pages the significance of each
implication will be discussed briefly in light of the American legislation
addressed to each point.
Economic Implications
In order to fully understand the economic implications of this shift of
recognition one must examine the current trade relations between the
United States and Taiwan, and assess its present and future value to both
countries. If these relations promise to have continued value to both na-
tions, the question of how the relationship can be preserved must be ad-
dressed. The value of maintaining the economic status quo between the
United States and Taiwan, however, necessarily will depend on predic-
tions based on present indications of the economic and commercial op-
" Despite Japan's shifting recognition from the Republic of China to the People's Re-
public in 1972, unofficial accommodations between the two nations enabled Taiwan to main-
tain a healthy economy, including continuing increases in foreign trade. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 20, at 5, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 654.
25 See note 10 supra.
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portunities that will exist for the American business community in the
People's Republic of China. Thus, cost-benefit analyses of fostering eco-
nomic relations with Taiwan and the People's Republic must be carried
out. Underlying such an analysis is the premise that there are fundamen-
tal differences in the role economic factors will play in both Chinas in the
1980's.
In the case of People's Republic of China, economic growth and rapid
industrialization are turning that nation into a major world power faster
than anyone anticipated. A recent decision by Congress to grant the Peo-
ple's Republic "most favored nation" status,2 6 and a decision by Japan to
provide it with several billion dollars worth of credit,27 can only hasten
this process of rapid growth. Although some international economists
deny that this growth will turn the People's Republic into a great trading
nation with the United States,28 the magnitude of the economic develop-
ments cannot be ignored. It is not yet generally realized that People's
Republic of China already has one of the world's largest gross domestic
products (GDP), and despite several political disruptions and economic
dislocations the GDP over the past two decades has grown on an average
of six percent per year.29 If the present leadership can consolidate its au-
thority in the country, and avoid becoming involved in a military confron-
tation with the Soviet Union, prospects for a seven percent rate of eco-
nomic growth for the People's Republic are very good.30 This would in
turn enhance the prospects for American business in certain areas in the
long run."1 Increases in international commerce in the People's Republic
historically has paralleled increases in its GDP, despite statements from
2" Washington. Post, July 8, 1979 at 1.
27 See "China-Japan Import Financing Accord Nears," N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1979, IV, at
2, col. 1; "China Seeks Major Loan," N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1979, IV, at 4, col. 3; "China Asks
Japan For $5.5 Billion Loan For Rail, Port and Power Projects," N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1979,
IV at 5, col. 4. China's recent admission to the International Monetary Fund creates another
source of international financial assistance for the People's Republic. See note 59 supra.
28 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (statement of Professor
D. H. Perkins). For an exhaustive treatment of the issues surrounding United States trade
relations with the People's Republic, see Dernberger, Prospects for Trade Between China
and the United States, in CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S. POLICY 183 (A. Eckstein ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as Dernberger].
29 The estimated gross domestic product of the People's Republic in 1976 was $340
billion. NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATION, INC., THE WORLD ALMANAC & BooK OF FACTS
525 (1980).
20 At roughly a 7% yearly growth rate, gross domestic product doubles every ten years.
Thus, by the year 2000, the People's Republic could have a gross domestic product of over
$1,000 billion.
I1 The current leadership in the People's Republic is the most economic growth ori-
ented that China has had in a very long time. Thus, factors that could preclude a sudden
dramatic increase in American trade relations with the Peoples' Republic, see Dernberger,
supra note 28; text accompanying notes 40-41 infra, will not necessarily cloud the long term
prospects. These may hinge on the extent to which the present Chinese leadership can re-
tain power and make economic growth a permanent major policy objective.
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the Chinese leadership from time to time about reducing their country's
dependence on foreign trade. If anything, it is likely to go up as China
seeks highly sophisticated American and Japanese technology and initi-
ates major investment devices in certain sectors of its economy.3 2 The
United States will benefit by those devices.
Unlike the People's Republic, while Taiwan will never become a major
world power, it is already an important trading partner of the United
States. If we characterize economic growth in the People's Republic as
"better than respectable" over the past 20 years, by comparison Taiwan's
growth has to be regarded as "spectacular." This small island country has
brought about its miracle in economic growth generally and in the im-
port-export trade in particular. In the 20 year period from 1955 to 1975,
Taiwan's gross domestic product grew at an average rate of eight percent
per year. 3 American economic assistance, of course, contributed substan-
tially to this growth, but only in the period from 1950-1965. In the most
recent decade, and without the American assistance, Taiwanese growth
has been even higher, 3 an even more impressive achievement given the
devastating blow OPEC oil prices have dealt to most Third World econo-
mies. During the past twenty year period, Taiwan's exports in money
terms have grown at a fantastic rate of twenty-six percent per year.
3 5
Throughout the later half of this period the United States has been the
major market for Taiwanese exports and its share of Taiwanese imports
has also been rising in recent years as Taiwan continues to cut back on its
purchases from Japan.
Briefly put, for the present Taiwan remains an economic bonanza for
the American business community but a liability in terms of world polit-
ics." The People's Republic, on the other hand, presents a promise of
See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra.
'3 Taiwan's gross domestic product for 1978 was $24.13 billion. WORLD ALMANAC, supra
note 29, at 526.
" Since 1965, Taiwan's real economic growth has, on the average, exceeded 10%. Esti-
mates for 1978 place the figure at 13%. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 22, [1979]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 671.
31 The fact that Tawan's general economic growth has been tied to impressive export
figures is a reflection of the unique character of the Taiwanese economy. Since the Island
has a limited domestic market, and domestic natural resources it relies heavily on importing
raw materials and exporting finished manufactured items. SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at
22, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 671. According to the data compiled by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in connection with the promulgation of the Taiwan
Relations Act, 32.3% of Taiwan's foreign trade in the first half of 1978 was attributable to
the United States. Of Taiwan's total exports for that period, 40.9% went to the United
States, while 22.3% of its imports came from the United States. Japan accounted for 11.8%
of Taiwan's exports, and 33.4% of its imports for a total share of Taiwan's foreign trade of
21.9%. Id.
16 The People's Republic's desire to move towards normalizing relations with the
United States likely was motivated in part by a rift with the Soviet Union over spheres of
influence in Indochina. To the extent that continued recognition of Taiwan stood in the way
of the United States benefiting from this Sino-Soviet rivalry, Taiwan constituted a political
liability for the United States.
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future trade and investments and is already becoming a very important
asset to the United States in world politics. Now, more than one year
after the shift of American recognition to the People's Republic, a central
question remains in the minds of American businessmen. Will the eco-
nomic situation in both Chinas continue as it has in the past or will der-
ecognition of Taiwan bring about profound economic changes in the
1980's? The answer depends to a large extent on the political forces of
our times.37 In one respect, Soviet adventurism outside its borders bears
directly on future American relations with Taiwan and the People's Re-
public. A Soviet threat to American interests in the Persian Gulf and In-
dian Ocean has been made explicit by their invasion of their helpless
neighbor, Afghanistan. s What the Russians do beyond that and how the
United States responds in the future will have economic consequences for
the People's Republic and indirectly for Taiwan. If, for reasons of our
national security and defense of Persian Gulf oil producing states, we are
drawn closer economically and militarily to the People's Republic, the
Chinese may emerge as being in a position to demand a partial or com-
plete elimination of our economic relations with Taiwan.
Another important political force that could shape American economic
relations with the two countries is the issue of Taiwan's internal security.
Having terminated the Defense Treaty, the United States holds a "prom-
ise" from the People's Republic not to annex the island by military
force.39 Yet unpredictable events in world affairs could lead the People's
Republic to incorporate Taiwan by force, destroying its economy as we
know it today and souring our relations (including economic relations)
with the Mainland. On the other hand, the United States can control, at
least partly, its own course in the face of this possibility. If domestic leg-
islation maintains strong American economic ties to Taiwan while the
United States moves rapidly to develop strong economic and political re-
lations with the People's Republic, the Chinese may spare Taiwan in def-
erence to a strong need for cooperation with the United States.
It appears the United States is moving in this direction. Taiwan will
be the beneficiary of such a move, however, only if the Chinese fully un-
derstand that Taiwan is important to us. Specific acts taken by the
31 See Dernberger, supra note 28, at 189-95. President Carter recently proclaimed the
effectiveness of a trade agreement between the United States and Taiwan. Pres. Proc. No.
4697, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2957. See Agreement on Trade
Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, re-
printed in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2958.
31 See "U.S. Reports Soviet Flying Many Troops to Afghan Conflict," N.Y. Times, Dec.
27, 1979 at 1, col. 6.
31 International statements and private comments to United States officials made by
Chinese officials have reflected a desire to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully. Nevertheless,
official Chinese statements intended for the Chinese people have not dismissed the possibil-
ity of reunification through force. In fact, however, the assurances made by the People's
Republic not to annex Taiwan forcibly are buttressed by the Mainlafid's failure to develop
the amphibious military capacity to mount an attack on the Island regime. See SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 20, at 6, 11 [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 655, 660.
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United States domestically will clearly put the Chinese on notice. Domes-
tic legislation will allow Taiwan to maintain commercial ties with this
country, something both sides want. Taiwan will continue to grow and
prosper in the future, albeit with a somewhat diminished rate of growth.'0
By giving the People's Republic the "most favored nation" status, the
United States has already made clear that it intends to increase its trade
with that country and to foster cooperation in other areas of mutual con-
cern. In the 1980's, prospects are that any rise in trade with China will
not be dramatic. General economic indications point to this conclusion.
To begin with, America is a latecomer on the China scene. Western Euro-
pean nations and Japan recognized China long before the United States
did and have a headstart as far as trade is concerned."1 Our strongest
competitor in consumer technology will be Japan while England and
France will vie for the Chinese market in military weapons technology.
Secondly, China, like any other underdeveloped country, is looking for
more aid than trade with the United States. Thirdly, revamping the Chi-
nese import economy to bring it in line with American technology, prod-
ucts and spare parts will take time, and there still remains the underlying
question of whether the Chinese want to be entirely dependent on Ameri-
can technology alone. On the brighter side, one can confidently say that
in some industries American products are so superior to others that the
Chinese will be extremely anxious to buy them. Notable among these
products are commercial aircraft, computer technology, communication
technology, and the necessities for a mechanized agricultural industry.
The Chinese are most likely to invite foreign technical assistance first in
their oil industry. They need American technology and expertise in order
to accelerate development of their offshore oil reserves. America's interest
in assisting in this endeavor is far from being limited to an economic one.
Nevertheless, the American business community will have to keep in
mind the fact that there will be little or no immediate prospects for pri-
vate investment in the People's Republic. Foreign ownership of plants in
China at the moment is illegal under Chinese law.4 2 Most likely, the Chi-
40 The expected reduction in the growth rate of Taiwan's economy stems less from the
fact of American derecognition than other world economic factors. Principally, there is a
growing protectionist sentiment in Western Europe and the United States, which will com-
bine with the over-inflated state of Taiwan's foreign trade to retard Taiwan's economic
growth. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
4' The advantage Western Europe and Japan enjoy in trading with the People's Repub-
lic is the result of two interrelated economic factors aside from their earlier commencement
of normalizing relations. The first is that items China presently imports from those two
regions will continue to be available from those sources regardless of whether the United
States can and does offer them also. Moreover, estimates indicate that the rate of growth of
Chinese demand for these items is only slightly greater than the future ability of present
sellers to provide an adequate supply. Thus the prospects for substantial American trade
with China in these areas will depend on aggressive selling practices rather than on any shift
in Chinese demand. See Dernberger, supra note 28, at 238-40.
42 On the general question of alien ownership of means of production and other capital
see J. COHEN & H. CHIU, 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 681-741 (1974).
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nese will open the door very slowly and carefully by allowing some ap-
proximation of joint ventures in some select areas of their economy.
American business will have to be ready, willing and waiting for such
opportunities.
FUTURE COMMERcIAL RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN-PROBLEM AREAS AND
LEGAL REMEDY
Taiwan's status as an economic asset and political liability to the
United States presents a significant challenge to American policy makers
seeking to capitalize on the beneficial aspects of continued relations with
the Island government. The Taiwan Relations Act4 3 is based upon the
premise that for domestic purposes the United States recognizes Taiwan
as a separate political entity subject to specific legal treatment under
proper American laws without reference to the People's Republic of
China." In other words, the United States is assuming, as it must, that
any benefits to be conferred on Taiwan by statute may be conferred with-
out regard to Taiwan's international legal identity. This premise is legally
sound. No nation is obliged to try to define Taiwan's international legal
status for domestic treatment purposes. Instead, the United States simply
has tried to spell out the specific manner in which future relationships
with Taiwan will be maintained by the United States. The most logical
way to do this was through legislation designed to resolve the legal
prQblems associated with certain types of unofficial future contact with
the Taiwanese people.
Taiwanese Government and Peoples Right to Sue in American Courts
and be Sued
One problem area that inevitably will arise in the context of continued
economic relations with Taiwan is the extent to which organizations and
governments of the two countries may have recourse to each other's do-
mestic courts. Under current legal practices, only a recognized govern-
ment has the capacity to sue in the courts of the recognizing state. In
Republic of China v. Merchants Fire Assurance Corporation4 5 the court
ruled in 1929 that the Republic of China was entitled to sue in the courts
of the United States after that country had been recognized by the
United States. American recognition was evidenced by the conclusion of a
commercial treaty between the two countries and America's reception of
the Chinese envoy.4 On the other hand, an unrecognized government
'3 See note 20 supra.
4' SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 7, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 656.
45 30 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1929).
" The court accepted the commercial treaty as partial evidence of an implied recogni-
tion by the United States of the new Republic of China. Id. at 279. Notably, however, the
Senate had not ratified the treaty at the time of the court's decision. Id. For a general
discussion of the doctrine of implied recognition, see LAUTERPACHT, supra note 4, at 369-408;
2 WHITEMAN, supra note 13, at 48.
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cannot sue in the courts of the United States, regardless of how viable it
may be in the world's affairs.'" Recognition has retroactive effect to the
date of inception of the new recognized government. This principle fre-
quently has been applied in cases decided by United States courts.48
However, it is important to note that recognition of a new government
does not invalidate the legal acts of a formerly recognized de jure
government.
4 e
What is being pointed out above simply suggests that under the do-
mestic laws of the United States, problems could have arisen as to the
legal status of the specific rights and obligations of the state of Taiwan.
In the absence of an enabling law, Taiwan could not enjoy any rights
before the American courts. The Taiwan Enabling Act has secured for
Taiwan the procedural capacity to sue in American courts.50 Taiwan also
is entitled to jurisdictional immunities "1 and to claim possession of prop-
erty it previously held before derecognition 5 2 Finally, there arises the
question of what effect American courts should give to Taiwan's future
legislation, judicial or executive acts.53 Comparable legislation will be
4' Russian Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923).
Cibrario was a suit for damages. In other cases, in which an unrecognized state merely
sought to maintain an existing state of affairs by seeking injunctive relief, American courts
have permitted the plaintiff to bring suit. Thus where the protection of a state's property, or
its true ownership, is at issue, and giving access to American courts will not aid the unrecog-
nized government, courts may not follow the general rule of Cibrario. See JAFE, supra note
3 at 124-26, 152.
8 See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1918). The fact that recogni-
tion has retroactive effect raises serious questions regarding the efficacy of the constitutive
theory of recognition. See text accompanying note 3 supra. Since an unrecognized govern-
ment's actions can be validated retroactively, it is clear that refusal to acknowledge those
actions when they are taken is motivated largely by political considerations.
"' See Civil Air Transport., Inc. v. Central Air Transport. Corp. [1953] A.C. 70. See also
Boguslaweki v. Golynia Amergka Linie, C.A. [1950] 1 K.B. 157.
50 22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(b)(7) (West. Supp. 1979). Taiwan's right to sue and be sued in the
courts of the United States is not conditioned upon a reciprocal right for the United States
in Taiwan. This right is guaranteed by another treaty. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation, November 4, 1946, United States - Republic of China, art. VI(4), 63 Stat. 1299,
T.I.A.S. No. 1871.
51 22 U.S.C.A. § 3309 (West Supp. 1979). Section 10(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act, 22
U.S.C.A. § 3309(c) (West Supp. 1979), authorizes the President to grant privileges and im-
munities to the Taiwanese counterpart of the American Institute of Taiwan. They may ex-
tend to that instrumentality and its personnel to the extent necessary for the "effective
performance of their functions." Id. Such privileges and immunities, however, may be
granted only if and to the extent that Taiwan grants "comparable privileges to the Institute
and its personnel." Id. The Senate version of the Act would have further defined the nature
of these privileges and immunities as being "comparable to those provided to missions of
foreign countries." As finally enacted, however, the Act contains no such limiting language.
Id.; see H. CONF. REP. No. 71, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 709, 716.
:2 22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(b)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1979).
1 See id. § 3303(b)(4) ("Whenever the application of the laws of the United States
depends upon the law that is or was applicable on Taiwan or compliance therewith, the law
applied by the people on Taiwan shall be considered the applicable law for that purpose.")
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needed in Taiwan to give the United States government and citizens the
same rights and protections that the Taiwan Enabling Act affords
Taiwan.
Protection of Private and Public Property Rights of Entities and
Persons in Both Countries
Significant economic relations cannot continue between the United
States and Taiwan in the face of derecognition without some assurances
that derecognition will not affect the Taiwanese government's ownership
rights in property it held in the name of the "Republic of China" as of
December 31, 1978 or that it acquired or earned after that date.54 How-
ever, such a provision need not apply to the ownership of diplomatic real
property located in the United States that the government of Taiwan was
allowed by us to take over before October 1, 1949. Similarly, there should
be protections afforded to United States citizens55 who, prior to January
1, 1979, acquired property or contract rights or claims against the govern-
ment of Taiwan and its various instrumentalities or agencies while it was
recognized as the "Republic of China." Debts and all other contractual
obligations between the two countries that have arisen in the past or may
occur in the future must remain enforceable in the courts of both coun-
tries. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 should continue to
apply to the authorities in Taiwan.58 The purpose of these provisions will
be to make sure that property rights, interests and contractual obligations
will not be affected in any way in the absence of diplomatic recognition.
Continued Economic Assistance and Loans to Taiwan
The continued stable existence of Taiwan after derecognition required
that Taiwan continue to receive credits from the United States Ex-
See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 27, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 676
("The Committee expects that courts in the United States will continue to enforce judg-
ments rendered by courts on Taiwan and that, on a reciprocal basis, the courts in Taiwan
will continue to enforce judgments rendered by the courts in the United States").
- 22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(b)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1979).
5" Throughout the Taiwan Relations Act, reference is made to the "people on Taiwan."
Despite initial disagreement between the House and Senate on the proper means to provide
a broad definition of that phrase, CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 51, at 19, [1979] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 717, the final decision to define only the term "Taiwan"
achieved that goal. Id., 22 U.S.C.A. § 3314(2) (West Supp. 1979).
Similarly, the "United States citizens" whose property, contract and legal rights against
the Republic of China should remain unaffected. by derecognition must be defined broadly.
The definition of the term "United States Persons" contained in the Export Administration
Act of 1969 is appropriate. It should be interpreted to include all persons doing business in
the United States who may become involved in litigation in the United States relating to
Taiwan.
" See 22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(a) (West Supp. 1979); CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 51, at
15, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 713 ("provisions applying United States Laws to
Taiwan are to be construed as all-inclusive . . ").
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port-Import Bank. Most importantly, Taiwan has to be assured of ac-
cess to insurance, loans and loan guarantees from the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation"' to avoid any special or discriminatory criteria
stemming from the transfer of diplomatic recognition to the People's Re-
public. Specifically, Congress has required the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation to provide investment guarantees for projects in Tai-
wan without regard to its provision that restricts, eligibility for OPIC
programs in countries with per capita income of $1,000 in 1975 dollars.5 8
American business in Taiwan probably will need a fairly healthy amount
of insurance against war risks, expropriation and inconvertibility insur-
ance in order to continue to do business on the island. These and other
steps will help assure that Taiwan will in fact continue to have the "pros-
perous future" that the Carter Administration says it foresees for Tai-
wan. 59 As a result, Taiwan will continue to provide good investment and
trade opportunities to the American business community.
The Creation of the American Institute in Taiwan and Its
Competence
The uniqueness of the United States' position after derecognition and
the tremendous importance of both normalizing relations with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China and maintaining economic relations with the peo-
ple of Taiwan requires the elaborate arrangement of establishing a pri-
vate institute to look after the extensive and varied relations between the
two countries.6 0 Nevertheless, despite the need for such a body, its exis-
tence may be challenged as an "excessive delegation of governmental
powers" to a private body. There certainly is merit to concerns expressed
by the Carter administration that too many governmental controls would
destroy the unique utility of a private institute by effectively transform-
ing it into an administrative agency of the federal government. On bal-
ance, however, the Administration's proposal in this area did not go far
enough to guarantee the Institute's accountability."1 Therefore, before
67 See 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1976).
68 22 U.S.C.A. § 3304(a) (West Supp. 1979). Aside from the per capita income require-
ment under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, all the criteria governing the activities of
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation apply with regard to Taiwan. Id.(b).
69 See President's Message, supra note 22. The United States recently has been faced
with a challenge to its ability to foster a prosperous econommic future for Taiwan, as the
International Monetary Fund admitted the People's Republic and removed Taiwan. "China
Admitted to I.M.F.," New York Times, April 18, 1980 at D1, col. 6. Although American
officials supported the move, they have held out the possibility of a special membership or
affiliation for Taiwan in the Fund. Nevertheless, Fund officials apparently are unreceptive
to such an arrangement. Id.
60 Although the practice of engaging in foreign policy activities through unofficial orga-
nizations is not new in the United States, see text accompanying note 23, supra, the breadth
of the Institute's activities makes it a unique entity. SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 20,
[1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 669.
1, Neither the Administration proposal nor the House version of the Act provided for
any extensive reporting requirements in connection with the Institute. See CONFERENCE RE-
PORT, supra note 51, at 18, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 716.
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any such institute could be created in final form, certain characteristics
were necessary in order to balance its suitability to its special function
and adequate protections from the dangers of unrestrained authority.
Thus, the Act provides for congressional oversight through mandatory re-
porting of agreements concluded through the Institute, consultations with
the legislature on the appointment of the Institute's trustees and officers,
and annual legislative review of its operating budget.6 2 Finally, provisions
were made for granting whatever necessary privileges and immunities to
the members and officers of the Taiwanese counterpart of this Institute in
the United States on a reciprocal basis.6 3
Issues of Weapons Sale to Taiwan
The absence of a mutual defense treaty heightens the importance of
the United States carefully formulating a policy concerning arms sale to
Taiwan. Policy decisions in this area must strike a balance, however, be-
tween economic and political interests that do not necessarily coincide.
Arms sale to Third World countries is a very lucrative business in the
United States and the government indeed will be under considerable
pressure from the arms manufacturers not to impose too many restric-
tions on sales to Taiwan. In the past, weapons sales have also helped the
United States' balance of trade. The grain embargo against the Soviet
Union, the almost total elimination of a weapons market -in Iran and
steadily rising foreign oil prices may create the temptation to sell weap-
ons to any country that can pay the price. Understandably, however,
China's sensitivity in this area may dictate that arms sales to Taiwan be
restricted strictly to defensive weapons. Weapons sales must not create
roadblocks in the way of any future peaceful resolution of the "Taiwan
issue" by upsetting the balance of power in the region. Taiwan, of course,
now has, or is demanding, sophisticated weapons as if it were preparing to
invade the mainland.6 4 The need for American restriant also is vitally
necessary to deter Taiwan from reconsidering its nuclear option. 5 All
concerned parties agree that because of American assistance in providing
nuclear power plants Taiwan has the capability to develop and produce a
nuclear device in a short period of time. At the moment, the national
power company of Taiwan has two nuclear power plants almost com-
pleted. Two more are under construction and another two planned for
operation in 1985. Spent fuel discharged from these plants will produce
more than sufficient plutonium to make low yield nuclear devices. Taiwan
6:2 22 U.S.C.A. § 3311 (West Supp. 1979); see id. § 3313.
63 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
6, SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 15-16, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 664-
65.
'5 Id. at 10-14, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 659-63. Congress made clear
that its primary concern in connection with all security issues surrounding the derecognition
of Taiwan was with striking a balance between enhancing relations with the Peoples' Re-
public and assuring Taiwan an adequate self defense capacity. Id. at 10, [1979] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 659.
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of course does not, at the moment, have chemical facilities to recover this
plutonium."' Thus, in the interest of maintaining amicable relations with
the People's Republic, and thereby securing certain international strate-
gic advantages, America's economic interest in promoting Taiwan's mili-
tary growth will have to be subordinated. Even within this framework of
restraint, however, derecognition of Taiwan required that additional leg-
islation be created to permit future arms sales to the Island government
under the Arms Export Act. ' 7 Yet Congress should enact more extensive,
although ultimately more controversial, legislation to keep Taiwan a
member of the Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund and to allow Taiwan's
continued use of the Defense Department's computerized system for or-
dering arms, continued visitations by American military mobile training
teams and the continued use of American military installations for train-
ing Taiwanese military personnel.6 8 Other forces of economic cooperation
can continue if both sides show enough imagination and understanding of
the other's legitimate, yet conflicting, interests in this most sensitive area.
CONCLUSION
The changes that have taken place in the last twenty years have made
it impossible for the United States, consistently with the pursuit of its
national interests to ignore the People's Republic of China. Consequently,
establishing full diplomatic relations with the mainland was a rational
and important decision. Defense of the same national interest neverthe-
less demands that the United States do everything reasonably possible to
maintain mutually beneficial economic and commercial ties with the Is-
land of Taiwan. These policies are by no means necessarily antagonistic,
but their independent success, and ultimate accommodation will depend
on the parties giving close attention to the areas discussed above and
many others. Beyond the specific questions, American policy in the 1980's
should be guided by more general objectives. Any list of these objectives
should include 1) an active search for a long-term position of some com-
promise between the United States and the People's Republic that might
ensure Taiwan's totally non-offensive economic and political survival as a
separate entity, perhaps along the lines of a prosperous Hong Kong with
some American supervision; 2) fostering a continued positive attitude and
66 Taiwan has conducted laboratory scale experiments in the recovery of plutonium
from nuclear power plant fuel discharge. Under threat of American sanctions, however, Ta-
wan discontinued these experiments. In this context it is important that the United States
continue to cooperate with the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency in in-
specting Taiwan's nuclear power facilities. Derecognition has not affected the inspection
arrangements so far. Moreover, the Act specifically limits the effect derecognition will have
on applications for export licenses for nuclear exports to Taiwan. 22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(b)(5)
(West Supp. 1979).
67 SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 14, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 663;
see 22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(a) (West Supp. 1979); text accompanying note 56 supra.
as SENATE REPORT, supra note 20 at 16-17, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 665-
66 (includes procedural scenario for future permitted arms sales to Taiwan).
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active cooperation with China in all walks of life, which will be both mu-
tually beneficial and costly to the People's Republic to lose should they
attempt to annex Taiwan through military aggression; and 3) finally de-
termining whether and to what extent it wishes to promote actively or
bring about a long-term solution of the existing tensions between the
People's Republic and Taiwan. Perhaps the United States could en-
courage trade and exchanges or even informal political discussions be-
tween the two countries.
I
